

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08357 01 OF 03 210028Z
ACTION EUR-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0755
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AMEMBASSY DACCA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 08357

USSALTTWO

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: CH, UR, PARM, PBOR, JA, KN, KS
SUBJECT: KAPITSA ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OTHER EAST
ASIAN TOPICS
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08357 01 OF 03 210028Z

SUMMARY: HEAD OF SOVIET MFA FAR EASTERN DEPT. KAPITSA
DOES NOT EXPECT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS TO IMPROVE SOON;
STATES SOVIETS DO NOT WANT CLOSE RELATIONS FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE; INDICATES SOVIET SENSITIVITY OVER
U.S. LEVERAGE IN SINO-SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS; REPEATS
SOVIET HARD LINE POSITION ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE;

EMOTIONALLY WARNS AGAINST ARMS SALES TO CHINA; DOWNPLAYS POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA; AND STATES THAT BEST POLICY FOR JAPAN IS CLEARLY TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. AND AN EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMENTS MADE BY SOVIET MFA CHIEF, FIRST FAR EAST DEPARTMENT, M. S. KAPITSA, DURING APRIL 11 CONSULTATIONS WITH UK FOREIGN OFFICE SPECIALISTS ON THE FAR EAST. FULL TRANSCRIPTS OF NOTES TAKEN DURING THE MEETING ARE BEING POUCHED TO ADDRESSEE POSTS.

2. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: KAPITSA SAID THAT THE CHINESE ARE PATHOLOGICALLY AFRAID OF THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THEY HAD IN MIND THE 1968 EXAMPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BUT IF THE SOVIETS HAD INTENDED TO INTERFERE IN CHINA, THEY WOULD HAVE DONE IT SEVERAL YEARS AGO. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE HAPPY IF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE ON THE LEVEL OF PRESENT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH JAPAN OR BRITAIN, I.E., PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES GOOD RELATIONS WITH CHINA BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF HER RELATIONS WITH OTHER FRIENDS. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT GOING TO ATTACK CHINA, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IS NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY UNJUSTIFIED CONCESSIONS. CHINA'S PRECONDITIONS FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WERE THE STATE-CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08357 01 OF 03 210028Z

MENTS OF PEOPLE WHO DID NOT WANT TO TALK. BUT THE CHINESE WOULD WANT TO TALK IN FIVE YEARS TIME, SINCE SOONER OR LATER THEY WOULD REALIZE THAT THE POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAD MORE ADVANTAGES THAN A POLICY OF ALLIANCE WITH ONE AGAINST THE OTHER. BY SUCH A POLICY, CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO PLAY ONE OFF AGAINST THE OTHER AND GET TAIWAN BACK SOONER. THE CHINESE DID NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THAT IN THIS RESPECT ANTI-SOVIETISM SIMPLY PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THE AMERICANS.

3. KAPITSA REPEATED FAMILIAR UNYIELDING SOVIET STAND ON THE BORDER ISSUE WITH NO HINT OF POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET CONCESSIONS. HE STATED THAT SOVIET TROOPS ARE IN MONGOLIA AT THE REQUEST OF THE MONGOLIAN GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE MONGOLIANS FEARED ANNEXATION BY CHINA. IF THE FEAR DISAPPEARED, THE TROOPS COULD ALSO DISAPPEAR. AS FAR AS THE LEVEL OF TROOPS ON THE BORDER IS CONCERNED, THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH COULD BE SORTED OUT AFTER RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED, BUT IT IS NOT LOGICAL TO DEMAND A UNILATERAL REDUCTION BEFORE THEN.

4. IN GENERAL, THE CHINESE DO NOT WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AT THE MOMENT, KAPITSA CONTINUED, ADDING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE SOVIETS REALLY WANTED TO EITHER. THE USSR WANTS TO TAKE THE HEAT OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP, BUT HAS NO DESIRE FOR, OR EXPECTATION OF, DRAMATIC CHANGES. AFTER THEIR RECENT EXPERIENCES WITH CHINA, THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT CLOSE RELATIONS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS, KAPITSA SAID HE DID NOT THINK THERE ARE SPLITS IN THE CHINESE POLITBURO OVER BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. (THE WESTERN PRESS OFTEN WROTE ABOUT SPLITS IN THE SOVIET

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 08357 01 OF 03 210028Z

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08357 02 OF 03 210736Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 08357

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR SECTION 2 OF 3 VICE 2 OF 2

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POLITBURO, BUT SUCH STORIES ARE NONSENSE.) ALL
CHINESE FACTIONS ARE ONLY PRO-CHINESE. THE SOVIETS ARE
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08357 02 OF 03 210736Z

CERTAIN THAT THE CHINESE WOULD EVENTUALLY IMPROVE RELATIONS TO A LIMITED EXTENT. BUT THE WEST SHOULD NOT FEEL ANXIETY ABOUT THIS. THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT AND ANY IMPROVEMENT WOULD ALWAYS BE WITHIN BROAD LIMITS AND WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE PAST. THE USSR DOES NOT EXAGGERATE THE CHINESE THREAT NOR IS IT AFRAID OF IT IN THE SLIGHTEST. IN ONE WAY, THE STRONGER THE CHINESE BECOME THE MORE OPPORTUNITIES THERE WILL BE FOR AGREEMENTS AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO.

5. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS SALES TO CHINA:

KAPITSA BEGAN AND CONCLUDED THE CONSULTATIONS WITH EMOTIONAL COMMENTS ON ARMS SALES TO CHINA. HE HELD THAT THE CHINESE SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS THEIR NUMBER ONE ENEMY AND THAT WAR IS NOT ONLY A POSSIBILITY BUT WOULD NOT BE SUCH A BAD THING. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY ATTEMPT BY THE WEST TO HELP CHINA MILITARILY, AND WOULD STIR UP (WITHOUT SPECIFYING HOW) AGAINST THE WEST COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA, BURMA AND THAILAND, WHICH KNEW THAT THE ARMS WOULD BE USED AGAINST THEM ALSO. THE SOVIET UNION IS TOO STRONG FOR CHINA TO ATTACK AND WOULD STILL BE TOO STRONG IN THE YEAR 2000. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE WILL TURN ON S.E.A. WHICH PEKING REGARDS AS CHINA'S POLITICAL APPENDIX. THE BRITISH RESPONDED THAT UK IS INTERESTED IN TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN SO FAR AS THIS IS POSSIBLE; SPECIFIC CHINESE REQUESTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF UK'S OTHER OBLIGATIONS AND GENERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES; AND THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT ENTER LIGHTLY INTO DEFENSE CONTRACTS WITH CHINA. KAPITSA REPEATED AT THE END OF THE CONSULTATIONS THAT ARMS SALES TO CHINA WOULD BE TAKEN VERY BADLY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD PROVOKE A SEVERE REACTION.
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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08357 02 OF 03 210736Z

ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT A THREAT BRITAIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT SHE WOULD LOSE 90 PERCENT OF THE SYMPATHY WHICH THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAD FOR BRITAIN IF SHE SOLD ARMS TO PEKING.

6. CHINA - INTERNAL: KAPITSA SAID THAT CHINA IS MORE STABLE NOW THAN IT WAS UNDER MAO. THERE ARE THREE MAIN FACTIONS: TENG'S GROUP RESTING ON PEOPLE PROMINENT BEFORE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION; HUA'S GROUP, WHICH CONTROLS THE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS, AND CONSISTS OF PEOPLE WHO EMERGED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION; AND YEH CHIEN-YING'S GROUP, WHICH CONTROLS THE ARMY EXCEPT FOR THE PEKING MILITARY REGION. CHINA'S MAIN PROBLEM IS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CIA ESTIMATES OF CHINESE OIL POTENTIAL ARE FAR TOO OPTIMISTIC. CHINA WILL HAVE TO LOWER MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO MAKE THE FIFTH NPC PLANS SUCCEED. IF THESE PLANS FAIL, TENG FAILS.

7. KOREA: KAPITSA SAID LITTLE COULD BE DONE ABOUT THE KOREAN PROBLEM FOR THE TIME BEING. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT BELIEVE WAR WAS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. THE SOUTH KOREANS COULD NOT FIGHT WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE AMERICANS, WHILE KIM IL-SONG IS WELL AWARE OF THE CHINESE AND SOVIET POSITION ON KOREA, ALTHOUGH THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE ACCEPTED IT. NORTH KOREANS HAVE ENCOUNTERED SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND ARE VERY UPSET ABOUT THE BLOW TO THEIR PRESTIGE CAUSED BY THEIR DEBT PROBLEMS. KAPITSA AGREED THAT KOREA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A DESTABILIZING ISSUE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK ARE NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD. MILITARY COOPERATION IS VERY LIMITED. CHINESE-DPRK RELATIONS COULD BE SIMILARLY DESCRIBED. HUA KUO-FENG WILL GO TO PYONGYANG THIS YEAR AND KIM IL-SONG WILL COME TO MOSCOW.

8. JAPAN: KAPITSA SAID SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS WERE
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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 08357 02 OF 03 210736Z

ON THE WHOLE NORMAL. TRADE IS INCREASING. THERE ARE REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND CONSIDER THAT U.S. INFLUENCE IS NOT AT ALL BAD. HOWEVER,

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08357 03 OF 03 210228Z
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PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 08357

USSALTTWO

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT JAPAN TO GET TOO CLOSE TO CHINA.
THE BEST POLICY FOR JAPAN IS CLEARLY TO MAINTAIN AN
ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. AND AN EVEN-HANDED POLICY TOWARD
THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. KAPITSA THEN DENOUNCED
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08357 03 OF 03 210228Z

THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE IN THE PFT AND WENT ON TO
STATE THAT MOSCOW HAS WARNED THE JAPANESE ABOUT THIS.

IF SOVIET TOES ARE STEPPED ON, MOSCOW IS QUITE PREPARED TO THROW ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH JAPAN OUT THE WINDOW AS WELL AS HALTING DISCUSSIONS ON A PEACE TREATY. KAPITSA SAID THERE ARE NO TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. THE JAPANESE HAD MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET TWO OF THE ISLANDS BACK IN 1956. THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAD GOTTEN USED TO THE ISLANDS NOW AND THE POSITION IS DIFFERENT THAN IN 1956. NEVERTHELESS, IF THE JAPANESE WERE TO TAKE A REALISTIC POSITION NOW, PERHAPS A SOLUTION COULD STILL BE FOUND.

9. ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY (ASACS): THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO TURN ASIA INTO A BLOC, NOR IS IT DIRECTED AGAINST ANYBODY. CHINA WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IF THE CONCEPT IS TO SUCCEED. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT PUSHING ACS TOO HARD AND IS PURPOSEFULLY LEAVING ACS VAGUE. THE BASIC IDEA IS THAT A SET OF PRINCIPLES SHOULD GOVERN RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GO AS FAR AS THE HELSINKI DECLARATION BECAUSE BORDERS IN ASIA ARE TOO UNSETTLED. THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE PUTTING A NEW ACCENT ON ACS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. TOON

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